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1)  If there is one  field in which history has  an  unfortunate habit 
of  repeating itself it is in that of  international trade.  In  times 
of plenty,  when  growth  is assured  and  prosperity  seems  certain,  we 
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is seen as natural,  healthy,  and beneficial.  But  as  soon  as  things 
start to  go wrong,  as  soon  as  we  are  faced with  a  recession,  there is a 
tendency  to no  longer wish  to practice what we  were  preaching before. 
Demands  by  both  labor  and  business  for protection against foreign  com-
petition,  be it fair or unfair,  become  increasingly insistent,  if not 
obsessive.  Import  competition is then often  claimed by  many  not only 
to be  injurious but also to be unfair.  If domestic manufacturers 
cannot  face  the  competition it is not,  they  argue,  because  they  have 
failed to modernize  or rationalize their production:  it is not because 
they  have  fa-iled  to recogni·ze  new  trading patterns  and  adjust to  them. 
It is invariably because their foreign  competitors  are  selling by unfair 
methods  and  a~ dumping prices  on what  they feel  by right is first and 
foremost  their market. 
The wave  of protectionist pressures that we  have witnessed since 
1975 has perfectly illustrated this  now  classical pattern.  In  1974  and 
1975  the world experienced the worst recession since the  Second  World 
War.  It was  followed  by  an  uncertain  and  slow  recovery in the  United 
States with  no  significant improvement  in  the  economies  of  Euroi:)e• 
At  the  same  time  we  were witnessing  the  emergence  of new 
competitors  in fields  where  the traditional industries of the  developed 
countries were  already struggling with structural problems. 
WITH  FEW  EXCEPTIONS .•• -· 
2) 
With  few  exceptions  trade deficits piled up,  partly as  a  result of 
the-ever increasing cost of  imported oil.  The  response  to all of 
that has  been  a  flurry of requests  and  demands  for protection,  both 
here  and  in Europe,  that surpasses  anything that we  have  seen  since 
the  Depression of the  1930's.  And  I  think it is  a  tribute to  the cour-
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that they  have  to  a  large extent resisted those protectionist pressures. 
Now  it may  be  true that imports  have  played  a  part in the  recent 
and  present difficulties of  some  of our industries.  But  they  are not 
the only,  nor  even  the principal,  factor  involved.  Very  often  they 
serve  only  to highlight much  deeper  and  more  serious  problems  in those 
industries.  And  trade  laws  designed  to protect industries against 
injurious competition,  whether  fair or unfair,  though  they  have  a  role 
to play,  are  not necessarily the most  adequate,  nor  the  only possible 
remedy.  Solving the difficulties that some  of our industries  face  at 
present  requ~res that we  deal with the  problem at its roots.  It is 
not  just a  matter of greater enforcement of  law  and  order in the inter-
national  marke~place.  We  have  to tackle  the  causes of the  threatened 
breakdovm.  The political will that existed formerly  and still exists 
towards  free  trade in general must  now  be  accompanied  by  an  additional 
commitment to deal with  the  structnr~l problems.  And  by  structural 
problems  I  mean  the overcapacity and lack of competitiveness  that exist 
in such  industries  as  steel,  textiles,  footwear,- synthetic fibers  and 
shipbuilding;  a  list that could  grow  longer in the  future. 
If such problems  are  allowed to persist,  and are only dealt with 
by  way  of anti-dumping measures,  safeguard clauses,  countervailing 
duties or section  337  investigations,  in the  long  term nothing will be 
resolved.  In fact there is  a  very real danger  that we  shall only 
EXACERBATE  TENSIONS  IN  THE .•.. 
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tensions  in  the  international trading  system.  These  kinds 
cX.lCCt"b~tC 
S  will invite similar responses  from  others;  they  could  o!  response 
re  and  more  protectionist in nature,  and  miaht ultimately  bccoPc  mo  ~ 
threaten  the  free  trade  system that has  been at the base of  our  common 
prosperity for  the past thirty years • 
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nineteen thirties to know  that it would  be  a  disaster  - our first  aim 
must  be  to try and restore economic  growth  and  stabilise exchange  rates. 
- But even if we  are able  to  do  that,  the effects will not be  immediate, 
nor will everything have  been  solved.  For the  commercial  and  industrial 
problems  that will remain,  governments  must  at the  same  time  have  at 
hand subtler tools  than merely trade  laws.  In  Europe  we  believe that 
governments  should not  be  faced,  as  they  tend  to be  in the  United states, 
withihe stark choice:  restrict imports  or do  nothing at all.  They 
must  also be  equipped to deal with  the  real causes of the problem. 
We  do  o~ course,  in  th~ European  Community,  still have at our 
disposal  the conventional instruments  to deal with injurious  competition 
where it affec~s us.  But  today  we  only  use  such instruments,  where 
occasion demands,  towards  the outside world  - and  then,  I  would  emphasize, 
with  some  reluctance. 
At  this point let me  say  a  word  about those  instruments.  We  have 
anti-dumping legislation - which  can  also be  used against subsidies  - and 
we  have  a  safeguard clause.  We  do  not have,  however,  the  equiv-
alent of your  Sec~ion 301  of the Trade  Act which  provides  for retaliation 
against unfair trade practices  by  foreign  governments;  nor  do  we  have 
the equivalent of Section  337  of the Tariff Act to deal with unfair 
practices in import trade. 
BOTH  OUR  ANTI-DUMPING .•• 4/ 
Both our  anti-dumping legislation and  our safeguard clause  follow 
closely  the  rules of the  GATT. 
Our  anti-dumping  law,  like yours,  requires  a  showing  of  sales at 
less than "fair value"  and of injury.  It provides  for  provisional 
measures;  what  you would  call  'withholding appraisement'. 
___  The  safeguard clause  allows  us  to  limit imports  of  a  product into 
the  Community  where  the  product in question is being  imported  in such 
increased quantities  as  to  cause or threaten to cause  substantial 
injury to our  own  producers. 
I  should  also mention that when  the  Commission,  the Community's 
executive  and  administrative branch,  decides  to  impose  dumping  duties 
or to take  safeguard actions,  such decisions  have  to be  confirmed at 
the political level by  the Council of Ministers. 
As  you  can  see  these  two  statutes are similar in purpose  to your 
own  trade  laws  but they differ significantly in two  ways. 
First, ~under our  laws it is more  difficult for  firms  to obtain 
relief  from  import competition.  We  employ stricter criteria in deciding 
whether  the  situation warrants  such relief.  In addition,  each  case 
has  to  be  considered  and  acted upon  at the highest political level  - by 
the Council  of Ministers. 
The other major difference is that our  laws  allow more  discretjon 
to the  Commission.  In the case of  dumping,  the initiation of  inves-
tigations is not automatic  as it is in this country.  In  addition,  the 
Commission has  the power  to refuse to grant relief, if it considers 
that it would  not be in the best interests of the  Community  to  do  so, 
even  where  the existence of dumping  has  been proved. 
As  a  result  the number  of investigations  conducted by  the 
Commission is,  so  far,  much  lower  than that conducted in the  U.S .• 
BEARING  IN  MIND ••. 5/ 
Bearing  in mind  that we  are talking about  two  single markets  of  compar-
able  size,  from  1970  to mid-1977  the  United States investigated more 
than  200  cases  of alleged dumping  and  around  70  coutervailing duty 
cases.  In the  same  period the European  Community  investigated less  than 
40  similar cases.  Where  the  Commission  turned  down  requests  for  inves-
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tigations,  it did so  becausE~ it felt that such investigations would  have 
been of more  harm  than help to  international  trade. 
As  far as  escape  clause  cases are  concerned out of the  43  safeguard 
actions  that we  have  taken between  1.968  apd  Jl,J.ly  1977,  almost all  came 
under  the multi-fibre agreement,  and  have  s~nce e~ther been  eliminated or converted 
into bilateral agreements  under  the MFA. The  few  remaining cases  involved 
either state trading countries,  countries with which  we  have  a  bilateral 
agreement  or non-members  of the  GATT.  In  all that time  only one 
action has been  taken under  the normal  safeguard clause,  Article  XIX  of 
the  GATT. 
As  I  said earlier,  and  as  I  think the facts  demonstrate,  we  have 
. 
used our trade  laws  sparingly.  That  is because  we  have  a  philosophy 
in dealing with  these  problems  that stems directly from  our experience 
in managing  f~ee trade within the  Community.  As  you  know,  we  have 
created one  singilie  market where  nine  separate markets  existed before. 
In doing  so  we  have  got rid of national safeguard legislation and 
national  anti~dumping laws  which  could have  restricted the  free  move-
ment  of goods  between  our nine countries.  We  have  also instituted a 
competition policy - an anti-trust policy for  the whole  Community  -
which is aimed at avoiding  the distorting effects of subsidies  and 
monopoly  practices.  But  we  haven't left it just at that. 
What  we  have  attempted to do  in the  Community  is not only enjoy 
the prosperity that comes  from  a  liberal trading  system but also 
mitigate the effects of unbridled competition where  they  impinge  on 
SECTORS  AND  REGIONS  THAT  ARE ••• 6/ 
sectors  and  regions that are least able  to withstand it. 
Inevitably there will be casualties in the kind  of totally free 
and  open  competitive situation that we  encourage.  But  we  are not  pre-
pared  to sit and  watch  those casualties bleed to death without lifting 
a  finger.  Politically and  morally  that would  be  unacceptable.  Nor 
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would it do  much  to persuade  people  of the benefits of the  free market 
system.  What  we  try and  do  is foresee  where  the blows  are likely to 
fall  and  take  corrective action before  the  damage  is  done.  Thus  if 
a  particular industry appears  to be  threatened by  competition  we  do  not 
leave it to be wiped  out nor  do  we  preserve it in the  aspic of protec-
tionism.  Our  aim is to anticipate the problem and  develop  industrial 
policies which will make  that industry better able  to  face  the realities 
of  the marketplace. 
That does  not mean  Big  Brother telling industry what  changes  to 
make  and  how  to make  them.  The  final decisions will lie with business, 
. 
with the  owners  and managers  of individual  companies.  What  we  can 
do  is present  a  global view of the  problems  and
1by  throwing  light on  the 
help  a  particular industry to see  how it might  adapt itself to  changing 
conditions.  At  the  same  time  our social policies  - funds  for  retraining 
for example  - can make  an  additional contribution to  the  adjustment 
process  by helping to  ease  the  unemployment  that will be  inevitable. 
To  the extent that we  make  our presence felt in the marketplace,  we 
do  so for the sake  of greater efficiency;  in the  name  of more,  not  less, 
competition. 
Similarly,  we  have  to be  aware  of the effects that an  open  trading 
system will have  on  the poorer regions  of the  Community.  You  cannot, 
for example,  expect Southern Italy,  Southwestern France,  Northeast 
England or Ireland to  face  overnight the economic  challenges  of  West 
GERMANY,  BELGIUM,  OR  HOLLAND. 7/ 
Germany,  Belgium or ROlland without  some  kind of support.  And  we  give 
them  support,  financial  transfers  from  the richer areas  to  the poorer, 
so that they  can  become  full  and equal partners  in  a  common  economic 
system. 
Our  experience,  as  we  have  dismantled trade barriers within the 
- --· 
Community,  has  confirmed  us  in our belief that free  trade is  a  necessary 
condition of prosperity.  But  on its own it is not enough.  For it to be 
wholly beneficial,  for it to  improve  all our peoples'  living standards, 
it must  be  accompanied  by  social,  regional  and  industrial policies that 
maintain some  kind of  economic  balance  between different areas  and 
industrial sectors in the  Community.  And  I  make  no  apology  for  saying 
that all of this means  that government  has  a  role to  play. 
Let  me  illustrate what  I  mean  by  describing what  we  have  attempted 
to  do  to deal with  the crisis in  the  steel industry.  Since  1975  the 
world steel industry has  been  going  through  one  of the  most  severe 
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Everywhere,  including Japan,  production has  dropped  and  prices  have 
sunk  to levels below cost of  production.  Firms  have  suffered losses, 
plants  have  closed dovm  and  thousands  of \vorkers  have  been laid off. 
The  European steel industry has  been particularly affected. 
Traditionally a  net exporter, it has  had  to  suffer  from  the  cumulative 
effects of  a  reduction in its internal demand,  an  increase  in  imports 
and  a  reduction of its exports,  which  normally  account  for  15-20%  of 
production.  As  a  result,  production which  had  reached  155  million tons 
in 1974,  dropped  to 126 million tons  in 1977.  In  the  last two  years 
our steelmakers  have  been operating at an  average  of only  62%  capacity. 
Prices  on  the internal market in 1977  dropped  to  50  or in  some  cases 
75%  of their 1974  levels,  bringing  firms  to the brink of bankruptcy. 
IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL  MARKETPLACE .. 8/ 
In the international marketplace,  this crisis has  led to  a  cut-
throat competition,  further disrupting already badly affected industries 
Pressures  by  industries  on  governments  to obtain protective measures 
became  greater  and greater as  the situation deteriorated.  In the 
United  States,  the steel industry first of all filed  a  number  of  com-
------------------------------
plaints under  the  various  trade  laws  and  piled  up  its demands  for 
quantitive restrictions.  Then  at the  beginning of 1977,  it decided to 
concentrate its efforts  on  the dumping  approach,  filing  a  string of 
petitions against Japanese  and  European  producers.  Given  the  fact that 
the world  market prices were  below cost of production  and  given  the 
provisions of the  U.S.  antidumping  law,  such petitions  could  very 
well  have  led to  the  elimination of  imports  from  the  U.S.  market,  there-
by  making  even worse  an  already chaotic situation. 
What  had originally appeared  to be  one  of those  cyclical  slow-
downs  that periodically affect the  steel industry has  thus  turned  into 
-. 
The  general economic  situation, 
particularly in Europe,  where  the  economy  had  not really picked  up  since 
1975,  is unquestionably one  of the  causes  of  the persistent difficulties 
of this sector.  But  the duration  and  the  depth of this crisis indicate 
that there are other more  permanent  factors  involved. 
First,  overcapacity;  it exists for  two  reasons  - investment in  new 
plants  that resulted  from  overoptimistic forecasts of the  long-te~ 
demand  for steel and  the fact that many  developing countries  are  now 
not only producing  steel for their own  needs  but also exporting 
it. 
At  the  same  time  the  traditional steel manufacturers  had  lost their 
competitive edge vis-a-vis both these  new  producers  and  Japan. 
GIVEN  THESE  ELEMENTS ••• Given  these  elements,  it was  clear to us  in Europe  that  none  of 
the tools provided by  the  trade  laws  could by  themselves  be  a  suitable 
remedy.  Anti-dumping  laws  were  originally designed  to  give  individual 
firms  the possibility of obtaining relief from  the unfair pricing 
policies of individual  foreign  competitors.  They  were  not designed 
to  serve  as  a  remedy  for  a  crisis of  this magnitude.  To  close  the 
U.S.  and  E.C.  markets  to  foreign  exporters would  only  have  resulted 
in displacing  the  problem,  not solving it.  Nor  could quantitative 
restrictions be  considered  a  suitable remedy.  We  had  already  learned 
the lesson of  "voluntary restraint agreements"  in the  late sixties  and 
early seventies.  Something,  however,  had  to be  done  to  avoid  the total 
collapse of major  firms.  Neither  the  U.S.  nor  the  E.C.  could afford 
to let their steel industry  go  down  the drain.  It was  estimated that 
left to free  market  forces,  30%  of the European  industry would  be  forced 
to close  down  in  a  matter of months,  with the  unbearable  consequences 
on  employment  that  one  can. imagine.  A  truce had  to  be  called to 
------- ·- ... -- -------·· create the: climate-necessary  to-undertake the  long-term effort of 
modernization~ adaptation of production  capacities  to  new  market 
conditions,  and rationalization. 
That is the  reason  why  the  EC  has .engaged,  since  1976,  in a 
comprehensive  program of measures  designed to deal  with  the  short term 
as  well as  the  long  term aspects  of  the problem. 
To  deal with the  short term crisis,  the  Commission  decided in early 
1977  to ask  the  European  producers  to  freeze  their present capacity 
and to agree voluntarily to reduce  their output by  assigning  them 
given production targets.  The  idea behind this  scheme  was  to organize 
on  a  voluntary basis,  an  orderly adaptation of production  to  the  new 
market conditions which would  also help raise prices. 
AT  THE  SA.VJ:  TIHE •••• lD/ 
At  the  same  time producers  agreed  to respect guideline prices 
for  the main  rolled steel products ..  Mandatory  minimum  prices were  set 
by  the Commission  for  one  product,  to which were  added  subsequently  two 
others. 
___________________  After  a  while it became  clear that the_ discipline  requested of the 
European producers  would  not  have  the required effect if a  similar 
discipline was  not exercised by  foreign  industries.  To  this effect, 
the  Commission  instituted,  at the beginning of 1978,  a  system similar 
to your trigger price mechanism,  which  is now  being gradually replaced 
by  a  series of bilateral agreements with our  main  suppliers. 
Under  these  agreements  the countries  concerned agree to  require 
their steel producers  not to sell in the  Community  at prices  lower  than 
4-6%  below :the  guideline prices  and,  as  a  counterpart,  their exports 
to the  Community  are guaranteed at levels which  take into account  the 
"traditional flows  of trade". 
Our  ob]ec~ive in taking  these measures,  which we  see  as  being 
temporary,  is to help the steel industry find part of  the  resources 
needed  for its modernization. 
For  the  long term,  national  plans within the  Community,  for  restruc-
turing the steel industry,  are  already  under way.  For its part,  the 
Commission has  the power to borrow  funds  on  the private capital markets 
and  to re-lend  them to steel companies  in the Community.  This will 
help make it possible for  those  firms  to reationalize  and modernize  and 
will also assist in the relocation and  retraining of workers  affected 
by the closure of obsolete plants. 
The  Commission will also be  closely monitoring  the national  restruc-
turing plans  to make  sure that they  do  not lead to further  surplus 
capacity n.or  to plants that are no  longer viable being kept alive by 
GOVERNMENT  SUBSIDY. 1~/ 
government  subsidy.  Within  the  Community  this approach  has  meant 
developing  new sets of relationships between  government,  industry, 
labor unions  and  consumers. 
Beyond  the  frontiers  of the  Community  we  have  been  saying  for 
some  time  that  the crisis in the  steel industry will mean  developing 
new  types  of relationships--between  the  Community  and its trading partner 
The  governments  of the  industrialised world  have  to start talking not 
just about  reducing tariffs  and  other barriers to trade  - the  trad-
itional stuff of commercial  diplomacy.  The  crisis in  an  industry 
like steel is worldwide  and  structural.  That  is why  we  have  to start 
talking about  how,  together,  we  are  going to  coordinate  both  our  domestic 
and  external policies to deal with  the  problems  we  share  in restructuring 
an  industry that has  outgrown  itself and  which  faces  new  market  condi  tiom: 
'·  Such  a  dialogue  has  already begun  in the  OECD  discussions  on  steel. 
In both  these talks  and  future  ones  the  Community  has  supported  and will 
. 
continue to suppor.t the idea of what  we  call 
1 transparency 
1  of the market 
- the collection and publication of the most  comprehensive data possible 
on all factors·· affecting the world steel market.  We  also consider it 
essential that  a  better international coordination be  established between 
. governments  so  that their action,  on  domestic markets  as well  as  extern:::  .. 
ally,  instead of being detrimental to  one  another,  complements  and 
strengthens  one  another. 
As  far as  the developing world is concerned,  there  too  we  have 
to strengthen the  links of  economic  cooperation - in our  own  and  their 
interests,  and not out of  a  sense  of charity or even  guilt.  In  the 
European  Community  we  have  already started to  do  this.  Not  only because 
of our colonial past but because  we  believe  the countries of the 
developing world to be  our  future markets,  we  are doing what  we  can  to 
BUILD  UP  THEIR  ECONOMIES. 1()./ 
build up  their economies.  We  already guarantee  the  raw material export 
earnings  of  53  developing countries  in Africa,  the Carribean  and  the 
Pacific;  we  have  also  freely  opened  our market  to  those  same  countries 
without reciprocity and  we  make  development  capital  and  technical 
assistance  available to them.  In the  future  this,  too,  will have  to be 
managed  an  a  way  that is in the best long  term interests of all parties. 
In the  course of this  summer  we  shall be  negotiating  the  next 
phase of this  economic  cooperation agreement  known  as  the  Lome  Convention, 
and  here  again we  are stressing the concept of  'transparency'.  If there 
is  a  regular and  periodic exchange  of  information regarding market 
opportunities  and  investment  plans  in sensitive products it may  be 
possible not only to avoid disputes but also  to create  an  orderly growth 
in our trade with  one  another.  Thus,  for  example,  if our  trading 
partners in the developing world  are  fully  informed  about  the  problems 
we  face  in,  say,  textiles,  they will be  in  a  better position to  judge 
. 
the wisdom of making  investments  in such  a  sector.  Conversely,  by 
having detailed knowledge  of sectors of our market where  domestic 
supply does  not exist,  they will be  able to plan accordingly.  And 
although  the machinery  for  these consultations will have  been  set up 
by  governments,  business  and  labor will participate in  them  and  the 
final  choices  in most  cases will be theirs. 
In all the areas  I  have  described  - restructuring of domestic 
industries,  trade relations between the nations of the  developed world 
and  between  them  and  the developing world  - some  might  argue  that all 
our problems  could be  solved by  leaving the  job to  the market.  But  at 
a  time  when  expectations of future  growth  are  low,  free  market  forces 
alone  have  a  habit of being  particularly harsh.  Moreover,  as  market 
FORCES  WERE  DOING  THEIR  VVORK •• 1.}/ 
forces  were  doing their work  - with all the  social and  industrial 
consequences  that would  involve  - the political pressures  for  protec-
tionism would  grow  so  great  as  to be  irresistible.  The  barricades 
would  be  up.  Not  only would  the  free  trade  system grind to  a  halt,  so 
too would  the  process of restructuring  those  same  industries.  The 
incentive to do  so,  the  spur  of outside  competition would  no  longer be 
present. 
That is why,  in Europe,  we  believe  that this process  must  be 
managed  in a  rational  and  humane  fashion.  The  necessary adjustments 
will  cause more  hardship  than  those  we  have  undergone  before  and 
therefore will have  to  be  made  more  slowly  than was  done  before. 
In  the  case of steel we  should all perhaps  have  acted earlier. 
For the  future,  in dealing  \vi th  the  problems  of injurious  competition 
within the  industrialised world,  and  betv1een it and  the developing 
. 
,-~::.:=--~·c:::.:__;:o  __  y.r~rld,  we  _ _?.r~_  -~ay_~ng_i:ll._~  ~·  PJ?~~-e?_t:ion is  b~-t:~t:r  _  t~an  __ cure.  Prevention 
will mean  some  painful surgery but we  may  otherwise  not  avoid  the 
disease of protectionism;  a  disease  for which  there  may  be  no  cure  . 
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